In addition to its traditional combative role, over the past decade, America has called the Army to execute a number of non-traditional missions that range from the support of civil authorities at home to nation building abroad. Beyond the emergence of money as a new weapon system, the Army"s expanded mission shows a need to have a trained, educated, and ready force able to deal with complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty. Using financial management company grade officers as its lenses, this paper examined the Army"s systems, policies, and procedures for training and developing leaders in the institutional domain. The results of this examination identified several obstacles with the potential to undermine full implementation of the Army Leader Development Strategy -an antiquated system to resource training and education; challenges encountered in balancing technical, tactical, and critical thinking skill in the available time; and specific issues encountered by junior financial management officers. This paper concludes by providing recommendations to the Commander"s Handbook that states, "warfighters with timely access to the right types of money and in the appropriate amount can influence the outcome of operations with both temporary and, hopefully, permanent results." 4 General Petraeus, fully understanding the significance of U.S. fiscal and economic power, has stated "in an endeavor like that in Iraq, money is ammunition. In fact, depending on the situation, money can be more important than real ammunition." 5 General Petraeus further included it as part of his
Multi-National Forces Iraq Commander"s counterinsurgency guidance. 6 The
Commander"s Emergency Response Program (CERP), federally appropriated funds "provided to military commanders to meet the urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements of the Iraqi and Afghan civilian population," 7 is an ideal example of fiscal power on the battlefield.
The importance that the military places on fiscal execution dictates that the financial managers serving in support of the mission have the proper technical and leadership skill requisites. Coupled with this is the expectation that leaders must be able to deal with complex, ambiguous, and uncertain situations. Accordingly, this paper assesses if the training and education development of company grade Financial Management officers meets the technical requirements of the operational environment, as well as the leadership needs of the Army as articulated in the Army Leader Development Guidance (ALDS). This paper begins by looking at how the institutional domain of learning supports the Army mission and some challenges resulting from the training requirements and resourcing process. Next, it will examine four specific issues facing junior financial management officers and how the Financial Management School (FMS) Captains" Career Course (CCC) prepares them to address these issues. This paper concludes with specific recommendations for changes within the school and the CCC program of instruction.
Army Mission and Three Training Domains
The mission of the Department of the Army is:
…to build a campaign-quality, expeditionary Army able to operate effectively with Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners across the spectrum of conflict to provide capable and ready forces to combatant commanders in support of the National Security and National Defense Strategies, while sustaining and maintaining the quality of the All-volunteer Force. 8 To provide the Combatant Commanders the ready forces needed to execute missions within their geographical commands, the Army utilizes three independent but overlapping domains of learning and development -operational, institutional, and selfdevelopment. When working congruently, these three domains provide trained and educated Soldiers, Army civilians, and ready units. Individual Training Solicitation (TACITS). 15 The Army G-1 and G-3/5/7 then co-chair the Structure and Manning Decision Review (SMDR), which validates the training requirements and reconciles differences between the requirements identified and the capabilities of the schoolhouses to execute the training. After the general officer steering committee makes final approval, the Army G-1 then produces the training requirements and the training program in the Army Program for Individual Training (ARPRINT). 16 Last, the Training Requirements Analysis System (TRAS) integrates the resources required for students, instructors, equipment, facilities, and ammunition with the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). 17 The Human Resource
Command (HRC) or individual organizations use the Training Resources Arbitration
Panel (TRAP) process to address changes to the validated training requirements or to request additional training not captured in this formal requirements build. 18 ATRRS, TACITS, the SMDR and similar systems and processes provide the skeletal structure for the next step, which is the development of training.
The Army uses a five-phase, Systems Approach to Training (SAT) model for analyzing, designing, developing, implementing, and evaluating cost-effective programs.
The goal of the model is to establish a "results oriented training program which provides people with the skills and knowledge to do their tasks correctly, efficiently, and with confidence." 19 This systematic, decision-making process "identifies what tasks, skills, and knowledge will be included in training; who will receive the training; and how and where the training will be presented. Although this is correct and necessary, the schoolhouse must rely on the TRAP process to obtain resources for current year additions to its training baseline. This represents the crux of the first challenge. For each additional formal training requirement received, the schoolhouse prepares and sends a workbook to TRADOC that identifies the additional resources (e.g., instructor, facilities, equipment, etc) needed to execute the requirement. TRADOC validates the requirements and sends the resources to the schoolhouse for execution. The validation process is slow, and the schoolhouse usually does not receive the resources in a timely manner to obtain the equipment unless it is under the government purchase card threshold. The biggest challenge occurs when the schoolhouse needs an instructor to teach the additional training requirement. Usually HRC is not able to support requests for active duty instructors due to ongoing operational assignment needs and the short duration of most additional training requirements, which means that the schoolhouse has to hire a contractor to teach the requirement. The FMS consistently has trouble obtaining a contract instructor with requisite skills to teach the class, or who will sign a short-term (6-months or less)
contract, and has to create alternative ways of filling the platform, such as requesting that an active duty unit send personnel to assist with instruction. The FMS is always able to "train the load", but the TRAP process results in some of the instruction being less than desired. presence at the school is critical.
The last challenge involves the number of instructors available for instruction.
TRADOC uses instructor contact hours (ICH) to determine the number of authorized instructors on a school"s TDA. The schools also receive guidance on the instructor-tostudent ratio for specific courses, such as using small group instruction with a leader-tostudent ratio ranging from 1:12 to 1:16. 23 The institutional schools need to meet the small group instruction ratio to facilitate the Experiential Learning Model (ELM) for delivering curriculum, which is becoming the standard means of delivery throughout TRADOC. For proper application, ELM requires a small group setting so that students interact, share experiences, and learn from each other. The challenge is that schools are near the bottom of priorities for fill under the Army Manning Guidance, 24 and therefore do not always receive enough instructors to fill the slots authorized. Even if HRC can fill the school"s authorizations, many times operational force needs take qualified instructors off the platform to fill individual augmentee requirements. In this case, the instructor is not physically present at the school, but the school still must carry that individual against the TDA authorization. With fewer instructors, the school usually has to increase the leader-to-student ratio to meet its mission, thus eliminating the small group instruction and ELM initiatives. In October 1999, the Army publicized its transformation plan and began moving toward a brigade centric force that would be modular, lethal, and rapidly deployable. Subordinates will note and emulate this disregard of intellectual responsibility. If the Army wants to continue as a profession, the individual members must get away from the "you develop me" mentality and embrace life-long learning as a norm.
The next imperative is "Prepare leaders for hybrid threats and full spectrum operations through outcomes-based training and education." 44 An imperative, which is synonymous with crucial or important, requires action by the institutions. As articulated in previous paragraphs, the growth of mission areas identified by the FMS Commandant is daunting and has potential for further expansion. An absolute that must occur is the cross walk between commandant identified FM full spectrum operation tasks, as well as doctrine specified core competencies, to the current and desired outcomes in the program of instruction. It is unfair to ask Captains to execute missions without the corresponding training or education, especially as the Army continues to move toward decentralization.
The last imperative is "Prepare our leaders by replicating the complexity of the operational environment in the classroom and at home station." 45 With so many of the officers now having at least one, if not multiple, deployments before attending the FM Captains" Career Course, building complexity into the instruction is necessary. The
Army is asking young leaders to do more, yet the institutional courses still provide basic challenges that do not force learners out of their comfort zones. However, it takes instructors to develop the situation and respond to learners" requests for information;
when manning guidance does not allow proper staffing of the institution, building complexity will receive lip service, but very little application. A quick review of a recent contingency operation highlights many of the FM issues previously discussed.
Haiti
On 12 January 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake hit Haiti causing massive casualties and damage to the state"s infrastructure. On 14 January, Southern
Command established Joint Task Force -Haiti to conduct Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief operations. 46 As army units began flowing into Haiti, some deployed with funded paying agents as the medium to buy operational need items. It soon became obvious that the operation duration would be longer than a month and that onthe-ground requirements dictated the deployment of financial management assets, both for finance and resource management execution. This small contingency operation highlights many of the FM challenges identified throughout this paper. 
